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Abstract
Two well-known mechanisms for enhancing managers’ accountability are yardstick
competition and internal monitoring. Yardstick competition puts managers in direct
competition when firms make decisions for re-appointment (Tirole, 2006). Monitoring
is used by firms to detect managers’ rent-seeking activities. While common wisdom
suggests that the joint use of the two means would reinforce each other in promoting
managers good practices, we find that their interplay distorts managers’ behavior who
may end up acting in a less accountable way. Furthermore, differences in monitoring
across firms bias that distortion, yielding even more counterintuitive results.
Keywords: Tullock context success function; rent seeking; managerial discretion
JEL: D, D2, D7, M2.
1 Introduction
Due to the separation of management from ownership, decision making within modern corpora-
tions implies that managers are in charge of firms strategic decisions, whereas owners exert their
control rights over these decisions. According to Tirole (p.29, 2006) and Williamson (1963), asym-
metric information between owners and managers leads to the possibility of rent extraction by
managers, which resembles the rent seeking behavior of politicians in public choice (Tullock, 1967;
Allers, 2012; Congleton, 2015; Di Liddo and Giuranno, 2016, among others). In this regard, Tirole
(p.28, 2006) argues that a competitive environment among managers plays a role in mitigating
this problem as ”close competitors offer a yardstick against which the firms quality of manage-
ment can be measured”. Yardstick competition occurs when agents perceive their probability of
being reappointed depending on firms’ relative performance (Congleton and Hillman, 2015). This
creates a strategic interaction among managers that could enhance their accountability.
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According to Williamson’s (1963) celebrated position, one common form of rent-seeking be-
havior occurs through managers under-reporting of the true profits of firms, which might be
detected through an auditing process (Williamson, 1975). Assessment based on relative profits
and auditing are two separate discipline mechanisms. One would expect that the joint use of
the two would reinforce each other in promoting managers good practices. Instead, in this paper
we find that the interplay between yardstick competition and auditing may hamper managerial
accountability.
In the next section we present the model and the results, while section 3 concludes.
2 A model of yardstick competition and auditing
We consider an environment with two firms, 1 and 2, their owners and their managers.1 We assume
that, unlike managers, owners cannot observe the actual profits of their firms. This generates
current and future rent-seeking opportunities for the managers. In our model rent seeking occurs
through under-reporting of true profits, as in Williamson (1963). The profit each manager reports
balances present and future incentives. Each manager is interested in appropriating the difference
between actual and reported profits today, facing the possibility of internal auditing, and being
re-appointed by her firm’s owner in the future.
Let Πi be the true profit of firm i in the present period, for i = 1, 2. We assume that firms are
symmetric implying that their true profits are equal. This allows us to disentangle the impact of
asymmetric auditing on managers’ behavior. Furthermore, we let pii ≥ 0 be the profit reported
by manager i in the current period.2 Then, Πi − pii is the rent of manager i (Williamson, 1963).
Denote by λi the probability of manager i getting caught for under-reporting. If i is caught,
she is not reappointed with certainty and she also has to pay a positive fine αi. Otherwise, she
will be re-appointed with probability fi(pi1, pi2). In this case, she gets a future payoff Ai, with
A1 = A2 ≡ A.
The expected utility of manager i is
Vi = λi(Πi − pii − αi) + (1− λi)
(
Πi − pii + δfiA
)
, (1)
where δ is the discount factor and fi is Tullock’s contest success function, i.e.,
fi =

pii
pi1+pi2
, pi1 + pi2 > 0
1
2 , pi1 = pi2 = 0.
The best reply function of manager i is
pii(pij) =

√
(1− λi)δpijA− pij , 0 < pij < (1− λi)δA
0, pij ≥ (1− λi)δA,
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Notice that the sign of the slope of the best reply function is
1The paper also applies to the case of two divisions of a firm.
2We assume that owners impose a minimum profit below which managers will not be re-appointed.
W.l.o.g. this profit threshold is set equal to zero.
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∂pii(pij)
∂pij

> 0, pij < (1− λi)δA/4
< 0, (1− λi)δA/4 ≤ pij < (1− λi)δA
0, pij ≥ (1− λi)δA.
Consider manager i. Her choice of pii balances two opposite effects, the effect on the current rent
and the effect on the re-appointment probability. The former effect is independent of pij , whereas
the latter depends negatively on it; i.e., a higher pij reduces the impact of pii on the probability of
re-appointment. In other words, it reduces the marginal gain of a higher pii. The higher (lower)
pij , the higher (lower) this reduction.
The equilibrium reported profit of i is
pi∗i =
(1− λi)2(1− λj)
(2− λi − λj)2 δA. (2)
From the above, we get the following result.
Proposition 1 There is an inverse relation between λi and pi
∗
i . Furthermore, if λi ≥ λj then
pi∗i ≤ pi∗j .
According to Proposition 1, there exists a paradoxically inverse relation between monitoring and
accountability. The reason is that as λi, for instance, goes up, future gains of manager i become
less relevant. To compensate for this loss, manager i tends to report less in the current period. As
a result, the manager who is caught with a higher probability than her opponent, reports lower
profits than her. Furthermore, that manager extracts higher current rent, but she is re-appointed
with a lower probability.
Notice that auditing has two effects on the expected payoff of manager i. First, it reduces her
current rent by αi. Second, it reduces her probability of re-appointment by a factor of λifi. The
first effect is independent of λi at the margin, whereas the second is not. If λi is higher than λj ,
the probability of manager i’s reappointment is affected more severely than j’s. To overcome this
relatively higher future loss, manager i will choose to report a lower profit than j.
In the following Corollary we study how the equilibrium strategy of manager i is influenced by
changes in the auditing probability of the rival manager j. Interestingly, we find a non-monotonic
pattern.
Corollary 1 The following comparative statics hold:
(i)
∂pi∗i
∂λj
< 0 if λi < λj ,
(ii)
∂pi∗i
∂λj
≥ 0 if λi ≥ λj .
The impact of λj on the equilibrium behavior of manager i depends on the relation between
the two probabilities λi and λj . Specifically, tougher monitoring within firm j makes manager i
less (more) accountable provided λj is higher (lower) than λi. Consider case (i) where λi < λj .
According to Proposition 1, pi∗i > pi
∗
j and hence fi > fj . As λj increases, then, given the inverse
relation described in Proposition 1, pi∗j declines and fi increases. This gives manager i space to
reduce her reported profit and still maintain a relatively high re-appointment probability. The
opposite forces work in case (ii).
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Another way to see the mechanics of Corollary 1 is by looking at the best replies. Recall that
the best reply of manager i is an increasing function of pij if pij < (1−λi)δA/4 and it is decreasing
otherwise. It turns out that pi∗j < (1−λi)δA/4 if and only if λj > λi. Hence, if λj > λi, we are in
the case of increasing best replies and a marginal change of λj affects both pi
∗
j and pi
∗
i in the same
way: namely both decrease in λj (see Corollary 1 (i)). On the other hand, if λj ≤ λi, we are in
the case of decreasing best replies so that a marginal change of λj affects pi
∗
j and pi
∗
i differently
(see Corollary 1 (ii)).
3 Conclusions
The joint use of different mechanisms for enhancing managers’ accountability, such as yardstick
competition and auditing, has not received adequate attention in literature. We have shown that
the use of auditing is detrimental to the self-regulating behavior of managers under yardstick
competition. When facing the possibility of being audited, managers end up increasing rent
extraction in order to compensate for the loss of future expected payoffs, leading to an inverse
relation between auditing and accountability. Furthermore, when managers are hit asymmetrically
by auditing, yardstick competition generates a bias in the sense that the manager who faces
tougher auditing behaves in a less liable way. Our results suggest the two instruments should not
be used jointly.
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